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AN ALCOHOL MINDSET IN A
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INTRODUCTION
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,1 the Supreme Court notes that on
average, one person in the United States dies every 53 minutes from a
drunk-driving related accident.2 In response to this epidemic, the states
and federal government have experimented with a variety of
increasingly harsh mechanisms to remove intoxicated drivers from the
roads and deter future offenders.3 Since 1906, states have attempted to
prevent drunk-driving by criminalizing it.4 It was not until much later,
however, that states would begin to use the blood-alcohol
concentration (BAC) of an accused as evidence: first as presumption of
guilt and then as per se guilt of driving while intoxicated when that
blood-alcohol concentration exceeded a certain level.5 Most bloodalcohol tests require some cooperation from the accused in order to
safely acquire an adequate sample,6 creating incentives for drivers to
refuse to cooperate with testing procedures to avoid the harsh penalties
legislatures have instituted in an attempt to deter drunk-driving.7 Thus,
legislatures in all states have passed “implied consent” laws, sometimes
Copyright © 2017 Devon Beeny.
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1. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
2. Id. at 2178 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED
DRIVING 2 (2014)).
3. See id. at 2168–69 (outlining the evolution of blood-alcohol prohibitions from
presumptions of intoxication at .15% to per se intoxication at .08% along with progressively
harsher penalties and additional mechanisms to ensure compliance with search requirements).
4. Id. at 2167.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 2168 (noting that a driver’s cooperation is necessary in order to acquire an
adequate breath sample, and highly encouraged when drawing blood to ensure the safety of the
officer and the suspected drunk driver).
7. Id. at 2169.
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also called “refusal” statutes that condition driving privileges on
cooperation with BAC testing if requested by an officer with sufficient
reason to suspect the individual is driving while intoxicated.8
In most states, if a driver refuses to submit to a chemical test the
driver’s license may be suspended or revoked and the very act of
refusal can be used as evidence of guilt in a drunk-driving prosecution.9
However, when even these penalties proved ineffective at securing
cooperation, several states and the federal government began to
criminalize the refusal to submit to testing, frequently with penalties
mirroring the jurisdiction’s Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
statute.10 During the 2015-2016 term, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the
Supreme Court consolidated three cases in order to determine
“whether such laws violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable searches.”11 This paper will review the factual and
procedural background of all three cases, address the legal landscape
before the decision, outline the Court’s holding in this case, and finally,
analyze and discuss that holding and its consequences for this area of
law.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the first of the three cases, State v. Bernard,12 police in Minnesota
received a report that three intoxicated men were attempting to
remove a boat from a boat-dock and in the process had gotten their
truck stuck.13 Upon arriving at the scene, additional witnesses indicated
that of the three men, the driver of the vehicle had only been wearing
underwear.14 William Robert Bernard fit this description and was in
possession of the truck’s keys when the police approached him.15 He
smelled of alcohol and admitted to having been drinking recently,
although he denied driving the truck.16 He also refused to perform field
sobriety tests.17 The police placed him under arrest and read him

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2167; consolidated with State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015) and
Beylund v. North Dakota, 859 N.W.2d 403 (N.D. 2015).
12. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762.
13. Id. at 764.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Minnesota’s implied consent law.18 They also offered to allow him to
call an attorney, though he declined to do so.19 After a call to his mother,
Bernard refused to take the breath BAC test the officers requested.20
He was charged with first-degree violation of Minnesota’s test refusal
statute.21
Arguing that Minnesota’s implied consent statute “violated due
process because it criminalized the refusal of an unreasonable,
warrantless search,” Bernard filed a motion to dismiss.22 The district
court rejected this argument, but dismissed the charges on other
grounds.23 The court of appeals reversed, finding that there were
sufficient facts to support a warrant application to search Bernard’s
breath.24 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the appeals court’s
decision that the mere existence of probable cause sufficient to support
a warrant caused the statute to be constitutional.25 Instead, they
reiterated the basic principle of Fourth Amendment that “[a]
warrantless search is generally unreasonable unless it falls into one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”26 They went on
to note that a BAC breath test as outlined in the refusal statue falls
within the “well-recognized” search incident to a lawful arrest
exception.27 Therefore, while the court of appeals’ reasoning was wrong,
the Minnesota Supreme Court came to the same ultimate conclusion
that Bernard’s refusal to take the BAC breath test could be
constitutionally criminalized because the search was a reasonable
exercise of the search incident to arrest exception.
In the next case, State v. Birchfield,28 the North Dakota Supreme
Court addressed Danny Birchfield’s appeal from his conviction for
refusing to submit to a chemical test.29 The record shows that Birchfield

18. See id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2) (“‘It is a crime for any person to refuse
to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine under section 169A.51
(chemical tests for intoxication) or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license).’”).
19. Id. at 765.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 765 n.1 (citing Minn. Stat. §169A.24, subd. 1(1)) (“A person is guilty of firstdegree driving while impaired or criminal test refusal if that person ‘commits the violation within
ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.’”).
22. Id. at 765.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 766.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015).
29. Id. at 303.
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drove into a North Dakota ditch on October 10, 2013.30 When an officer
arrived on the scene he determined that Birchfield was likely
intoxicated and asked him to perform field sobriety tests that Birchfield
failed.31 The officer then asked Birchfield to take a preliminary breath
test, which showed that Birchfield had a blood alcohol concentration
of .254 percent, over three times the legal limit.32 This preliminary test,
however, would not have any evidentiary weight, so the officer read
Birchfield North Dakota’s implied consent advisory outlining the
potential penalties for refusal.33 Birchfield refused to consent to a blood
draw and was charged under the state’s refusal statute.34 Like Bernard,
Birchfield moved to dismiss the charge arguing that criminalizing his
refusal was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.35 The trial
court rejected his arguments, leaving Birchfield to enter a conditional
guilty plea while reserving his right to appeal.36
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that
the refusal statute was constitutional because it did not force drivers to
submit to the search, as was clear in the case at hand where Birchfield
exercised his option to refuse.37 Similarly, the court cited Supreme
Court precedent supporting the idea that the criminal process could
sometimes discourage defendants from exercising certain
constitutional rights without offending the constitution so long as the
rights still existed.38 However, unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the North Dakota Supreme Court did not tie its decision to any specific
warrant exception.39

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The roadside test is not considered reliable enough to be evidentiary, but officers are
allowed to use them as a screening device. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2170
(2016) (“Because the reliability of these preliminary or screening breath tests varies, many
jurisdictions do not permit their numerical results to be admitted in a drunk-driving trial as
evidence of a driver’s BAC.”).
34. Id. at 2170.
35. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d at 303.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 308 (arguing that the statute does not authorize a warrantless search, it merely
seeks to incentivize consent).
38. Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980)).
39. See id.
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The last consolidated, Beylund v. Levi,40 case also arose in North
Dakota, and was decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court a month
after Birchfield.41 On August 10, 2013 a police officer approached Steve
Michael Beylund’s car after seeing his car almost collide with a stop
sign while making a right-hand turn and then come to a stop partially
in the roadway.42 Upon approaching the car, the officer observed an
empty wine glass in the center console and smelled alcohol.43 The
officer requested Beylund exit the car, but Beylund refused until the
officer opened the car door and again commanded him to leave the
car.44 Beylund was unsteady and uncooperative, refusing to engage in
any field sobriety test because he had a “bad leg.”45 He then agreed to
a preliminary breath test but was either unable or unwilling to provide
an adequate breath sample.46 The police officer then arrested Beylund
and took him to the hospital where Beylund was read North Dakota’s
implied consent advisory.47 The police officer requested that Beylund
submit to a blood test, to which Beylund eventually agreed.48 The
results showed a BAC of .250 percent, again over three times the legal
limit.49 Unlike the other cases, Beylund appealed from a Department
of Transportation order to suspend Beylund’s driving privileges for two
years.50 At the hearing, Beylund objected that the implied consent
statute was unconstitutional.51 Both the hearing officer and the district
court rejected his arguments.52
In the North Dakota Supreme Court Beylund focused his objection
on the “doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.”53 As that court noted,
“the government ordinarily may not grant a benefit conditioned on the
surrender of a constitutional right.”54 However, “the government may
lawfully impose conditions, including the surrender of a constitutional

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Beylund v. Levi, 859 N.W.2d 403 (N.D. 2015).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 410.
Id.
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right, provided the conditions are reasonable.”55 In this case Beylund
argued that, while driving is a privilege and a license is a benefit granted
by the government, it cannot make relinquishing Fourth Amendment
rights a condition of that privilege.56 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that it was unclear whether the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applied to Fourth Amendment rights, and even if it
did, the conditions of the search were reasonable given the state’s
interest in preventing drunk-driving.57 Therefore, the court affirmed the
district court’s ruling and Beylund’s suspension.58
The Supreme Court consolidated all three cases and granted
certiorari on the following question: “whether, in the absence of a
warrant, a State may make it a crime for a driver to refuse to take a
chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the driver’s blood.”59
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches.60 It is
undisputed that both the blood and breath BAC tests at issue in these
cases are searches under the terms of the Fourth Amendment.61 In
general, the Supreme Court has held that a warrant must be issued
before a search will be reasonable.62 There are several established
exceptions; the exigent circumstances and the search incident to arrest
could apply to implied consent statutes.63
However, based on the categorical nature of these statutes that
apply anytime a suspected drunk driver is arrested, the case-by-case
approach of the exigent circumstances exception cannot serve to justify
them.64 In Missouri v. McNeely,65 the Supreme Court ruled that the
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement may make
a BAC test a reasonable search in some drunk-driving cases.66 The

55. Id.
56. Id. at 411.
57. Id. at 411, 413.
58. Id. at 414.
59. Brief for Petitioners at i, Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 141468).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
62. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 2174 (discussing the inadequate justification of the case-specific exigent
circumstances exception).
65. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
66. Id. at 1560.
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Court specifically rejected Missouri’s attempt to create a per se rule
that would find such tests reasonable in all drunk-driving cases.67
Instead, the Court emphasized that the exigent circumstance exception
was by definition a case-by-case question such that the reasonableness
of a search could only be determined by analyzing the total
circumstances of the unique facts at issue.68 The McNeely Court did
note that other warrant requirement exceptions can apply categorically,
and specifically named the search incident to arrest doctrine.69 Thus the
question before the Court in Birchfield is properly whether BAC blood
and breath tests are categorically reasonable under the search incident
to arrest doctrine.
Furthemore, if the Court were to find that the searches were
unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, the question of whether
the states and federal government could condition driving privileges on
the waiver of those rights would still remain.70 As the North Dakota
Supreme Court pointed out, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address
whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which originally
arose out of Fifth Amendment law, would apply to Fourth Amendment
rights, making it an issue of first impression for the Court.71
III. HOLDING
Justice Alito wrote the opinion in Birchfield v. North Dakota for a
six-judge majority.72 Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsberg concurred
in part and dissented in part in one opinion, while Justice Thomas wrote
for himself, also concurring in part and dissenting in part.73
As previewed above, Justice Alito’s analysis relied heavily on the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.74 To
determine whether these searches, which are a product of modern
invention, and whose circumstances were unfathomable at the time the
Fourth Amendment was ratified, fell within the search incident to
arrest exception, he used a balancing test recently outlined in Riley v.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1559 n.3.
70. See Beylund v. Levi, 859 N.W.2d 403, 411 (N.D. 2015).
71. Id.; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016) (admitting that the
specific issue had not been addressed before this case).
72. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2174–75.
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California.75 There, the Court decided that “we generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement
‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”76 Justice Alito
then analyzed the privacy impact and governmental interests behind
both breath and blood tests separately.77
The Court found that “a breath test does not ‘implicate significant
privacy concerns.’”78 They are not physically intrusive or painful.79
Similarly, humans breathe constantly and have no property interest or
any claim to property-related privacy interests towards air that must be
expelled from their lungs in order for life to continue.80 Additionally,
with a breath test, no sample is left in government hands and the test
does not provide any information about the driver other than his or her
BAC,81 further limiting any intrusion into a suspect’s privacy interests.82
In contrast, a BAC blood test is significantly more intrusive.83 It
involves a painful intrusion into the skin and an extraction of blood,
which unlike air from the lungs is not something humans shed lightly
or inevitably.84 Additionally, a blood draw results in a sample of blood
being left with the police from which a great deal of information can be
extracted.85 As the Court notes, this might produce anxiety in certain
people regardless of the protections the state may institute to ensure
that use is limited to authorized purposes.86 Thus in terms of the Riley
balancing test, blood and breath tests are very differently situated in
the amount they infringe on the privacy interests of drivers.
The Court also found that the two tests were slightly differently
situated in the government interests they protect.87 The Court concedes
that “the States and the Federal Government have a ‘paramount

75. Id. at 2176 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)).
76. Id. (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
77. Id. at 2176–78.
78. Id. at 2178 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
79. Id. at 2177.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2178.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 2184 (noting that breath tests cannot detect non-alcohol intoxicants like blood
tests can).
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interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public highways.’”88 Included
in that interest is the need to deter drunk-driving.89 In that light, BAC
breath tests seem to easily pass the Riley balancing test. The
government interest being promoted is not merely legitimate, it is
compelling, and the privacy interest is negligible.90
To bolster this decision, the Court notes that in the drunk-driving
context a warrant requirement would be of negligible benefit to protect
privacy interests and would frequently impose substantial costs on the
government.91 This argument is based on the fact that the test is
conducted during a search incident to arrest, thus the officer already
needed probable cause to believe the individual was driving while
intoxicated.92 Additionally, because the facts that make up probable
cause are very similar in most drunk-driving cases, a magistrate is left
to rely on the officer’s characterization of the individual, and would be
“in a poor position to challenge such characterizations.”93 One of the
other benefits of a search warrant is to limit the scope of a search, but
in the case of BAC tests, particularly breath tests, that scope is already
limited.94 The implied consent statutes only allow the BAC blood or
breath test; they do not authorize any other tests or searches.95
Thus the Court determined that BAC breath tests after the arrest
of a drunk driver are reasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment.96 The states and federal government may require drivers
to submit to them as a condition of driving on state or federal
highways.97 Blood tests, however, are more intrusive and the Court was
not convinced they were necessary in light of the government’s ability
to use the less invasive breath test instead.98 The Court did note in
passing that blood tests are the only way to determine other forms of
impairment, such as marijuana or prescription drugs, but it dismissed
this as a reason sufficient to overcome the weight of privacy interests
because warrants and the exigent circumstance exception would still be

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 2178 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
Id. at 2179.
Id. at 2178, 2184.
Id. at 2181–82.
Id. at 2181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2185.
Id.
Id. at 2184.
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available to law enforcement in such a situation.99 Thus a blood test
does not categorically met the search incident to arrest exception.100
The Court notes that implied consent statutes that fall short of
criminalization for refusal are still applicable to blood draws.101 A
driver can lose his license for refusing to submit to a blood draw, but he
can only be criminally penalized for refusing a breath test.102 Thus the
Court does extend the Fifth Amendment unconstitutional condition
doctrine to Fourth Amendment warrantless blood tests, but draws the
line of “unreasonable” conditions at criminalization, not administrative
penalties.103
With respect to the three defendants, this means that Birchfield,
who was prosecuted for refusal to submit to a BAC blood test, had his
conviction reversed.104 Bernard was prosecuted for refusal to submit to
a BAC breath test.105 His conviction was upheld because the search
being requested was not unconstitutional, and thus could be required
of him.106 Finally, Beylund submitted to a BAC blood test after being
informed of the potential for criminal prosecution if he refused.107
Therefore, the question is whether his consent could be considered
voluntary because it only occurred after he was threatened with an
unconstitutional prosecution.108 Because the voluntariness of consent
is a factual question that turns on the totality of the circumstances, the
Court remanded Beylund’s case to determine whether the blood draw
was voluntary.109
IV. ANALYSIS
The Birchfield v. North Dakota decision is interesting first in the
dispute between the justices, and second, is perhaps flawed in its
emphasis on alcohol related intoxicated driving incidents to the
exclusion of other more complicated scenarios.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 2185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2186.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A. Disagreement Within the Court
The Court’s analysis is driven by the balancing test laid out in Riley
v. California, which requires the Court to carefully analyze the varying
importance of privacy protections versus legitimate government
interests.110 What is interesting in this analysis is the way different
members of the court treat the potential consequences of different
constitutional rules when making their decision.
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, focuses a lot on the limits of
a warrant requirement to actually provide increased privacy and
procedural protection given the nature of the arrest and probable cause
evidence at issue.111 Far from championing warrants as a safeguard of
constitutional liberty as one might expect in a Fourth Amendment case,
he notes that magistrate judges will be in a “poor position to challenge
. . . characterizations [made by officers about the driver’s apparent
intoxication].”112 On the one hand, this makes a lot of sense when
considering, as Justice Sotomayor does, that the warrant application
and affidavit may be presented to the judge by email or telephone,
giving the magistrate only a limited ability to question the officer or
evaluate his statements.113 On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment
itself seems to assume that judges will be able to overcome any such
difficulties, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence assumes that
“warrants provide the ‘detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate and
thus ensur[e] an objective determination whether an intrusion is
justified.’”114 Justice Alito’s willingness to assume the contrary is an
intriguing departure from the norm, and while not directly addressed
by Justice Sotomayor, may explain some of her concern that the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is being needlessly
undercut.
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor focuses much of her analysis on the
technological advancements that make obtaining a warrant quick and
easy.115 She discredits the Governments’ arguments that they need
implied consent laws in order to obtain evidence of drunk-driving and
that a reduced number of magistrates in rural areas would make
110. Id. at 2176.
111. Id. at 2181.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 2192 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting several
expedited warrant application methods).
114. Id. at 2187–88 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622
(1989)).
115. Id. at 2192.
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obtaining warrants in such areas a substantial burden.116 Based on the
total number of judges in the two states and the average rate of refusal
to consent to a search, she determines that each magistrate would only
have to handle one extra warrant application a week.117 However, it
seems likely that this does not fully account for the reality in these rural
states. As Justice Alito makes clearer in his opinion, the judges are not
uniformly distributed across the state, leaving some rural districts with
very few judges capable of issuing warrants.118 Similarly, common sense
would perhaps encourage the assumption that many, if not most, drunkdriving cases, and drunk-driving warrant applications will arise in the
dead of night when perhaps only one judge is on call to handle all the
warrant needs of a district.119 Thus while Justice Alito is dismissing the
practical efficacy of judges in such situations perhaps too cavalierly,
Justice Sotomayor is dismissing the burdens on judges in a similar
fashion. This dismissal leads her to decide that both breath and blood
BAC tests should require warrants.120
Finally, Justice Thomas ignores much of the practical privacy
concerns to argue from a more abstract position that a search incident
to arrest should incorporate any search of the arrestee’s person.121 He
argues this rule would be preferable because its simplicity would
prevent confusion among lower courts or law enforcement officers.122
However, his lack of faith in the ability of law enforcement and lower
courts to distinguish between two so plainly different BAC tests (blood
versus breath) is a disservice to both groups.123

116. Id. at 2193–94.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2181 (majority opinion).
119. From personal experience, governments in certain rural portions of the west do face
significant burdens if forced to acquire a warrant, even with the technological innovations
envisioned by Justice Sotomayor. For example, while working for the Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Yellowstone National Park during the summer of 2016, the author observed that it was common
to only have one magistrate judge on call to take afterhours warrant applications. Similarly,
depending on cell reception or other technological difficulties, law enforcement officers may have
to travel for long periods of time in order to gain access to a computer or to gain cell reception
necessary to submit a warrant application to the court. It should also be noted that while the
officers are jumping through the hoops necessary to obtain a warrant, the arrestee is sobering up
and the evidence of the crime is leaving his or her blood.
120. Id. at 2196 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 2197 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 2198.
123. Id.
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B. Alcohol versus Drugs
Birchfield is also an interesting decision because of the almost
complete focus on alcohol to the exclusion of all other forms of
intoxicants.124 Only one paragraph of Justice Alito’s approximately
nineteen-page opinion addresses the fact that some substances can only
be located through a blood test, thus the government’s ability to use a
breath test in no way helps them prove impairment in such cases.125 This
is perhaps understandable given that all of the petitioners were accused
of being under the influence of alcohol. However, as the only amicus
brief to directly address the difference between drug DUIs and alcohol
DUIs noted, many legislatures clearly had drug DUIs in mind when
they crafted their implied consent laws.126 As the amicus brief for
eighteen states notes, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration “reported an increase in the number of drivers using
marijuana or other illegal drugs from its 2007 study. Nearly one in four
drivers tested positive for at least one drug that could impair safe
driving.”127 As certain states continue to legalize marijuana, this
problem will likely only continue to increase. Given these facts, it is odd
that of fifteen briefs filed for this case, only two explicitly mentioned
the fact that breath tests would not measure the presence of drugs, and
thus argued that breath tests could not serve as a less invasive
alternative in all cases.128 Similarly, since combating marijuana and
other drug DUIs seems poised to be an increasingly compelling and
complicated interest for the states, the fact that Justice Alito dismisses
the argument out of hand is troubling.
The lack of briefing and argument on these issues in the decision

124. See generally id. at 2166–87 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 2184.
126. See Brief of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, Birchfield
v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (No. 14-1468) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.
Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)) (“Although breath testing has been recognized as less invasive,
it will not reveal the presence of drugs in the body.”).
127. Id. at 8 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS,
RESULTS OF THE 2013–2014 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE BY
DRIVERS (2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/812118-Roadside_Survey_2014.pdf;
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRESS RELEASE: NHTSA RELEASES TWO NEW
STUDIES ON IMPAIRED DRIVING ON U.S. ROADS (2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/
Press+Releases/2015/nhtsa-releases-2-impaired-driving-studies-02-2015).
128. See id. at 9; see also Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 6, Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (“Most States also provide for blood testing under
their implied-consent statutes. That method can detect drugs in addition to alcohol, and it is
sometimes favored because it measures blood-alcohol concentration directly, rather than relying
on conversion of breath-alcohol levels.”).
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may allow later courts to argue that it was an oversight, perhaps making
room to allow officers to draw blood if, and only if, they have probable
cause to believe the driver is under the influence of a substance other
than alcohol. This would mesh well with the bulk of Justice Alito’s
opinion which found the state’s interest in preventing intoxicated
driving to be exceedingly weighty, and thus if the question was squarely
presented a future court might find that those interests in highway
safety outweigh even the privacy and bodily integrity interests at risk
with a warrantless blood draw. Regardless of how future courts come
out on this issue it seems almost inevitable that blood tests for drug
DUIs will come before the Court in the future, either as here under the
search incident to arrest doctrine, or perhaps as Justice Alito forecasts
as an exigent circumstances case. To that extent, it seems likely that
Birchfield did not help to settle the law in this field, but merely provided
background for future litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Court came to a practical and moderate decision in this case.
As Justice Thomas characterizes it in his opinion, it is a
“compromise.”129 For the most part, this compromise struck a good
balance between the needs of the states to prevent drunk driving and
the needs of the people to be protected from unreasonable searches.
That being said, various portions of the opinion seemed to only
imperfectly reflect the likely or potential real-world consequences that
the opinion attempted to address. With respect to drug DUIs, the
disconnect seemed starkest, but the justices also appeared to have
radically different understandings of the abilities of judges on the
ground to assess warrants, and the number of judges available to handle
an influx of warrant applications in any given area. To the extent that
the legal conclusions were based on these flawed factual frameworks,
one must question whether the legal conclusions were truly the most
appropriate solution to these admittedly complicated and nuanced
constitutional questions. Perhaps in future cases the factual realities
will be better briefed, leading to a fuller understanding of the practical
implications of these decisions, especially because the Riley balancing
test seems to place the practical burdens on both government and the
public in the forefront of the analysis.

129. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2198 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

